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Essays on the Economics of Labor 
Demand and Policy Incidence
Andrew Garin
In the United States, a common policy strategy to expand 
employment and increase wages is to try to expand the 
demand for labor, either through support to employers in 
the form of subsidies or tax breaks or through direct gov-
ernment purchases. However, while demand-side policies 
should increase wages and/or employment in theory, it is 
often unclear who benefits from such policies in practice. 
In competitive labor markets, the benefits of employment 
subsidies may accrue largely to employers or to other factors 
of production besides the target worker population. It is thus 
crucial to empirically assess the real-world effects of such 
demand-side interventions using evidence from past expe-
rience, and, moreover, to identify the economic principles 
that determine why different policies may succeed or fail at 
achieving their desired impacts. This dissertation comprises 
three independent essays that study demand-side interven-
tions and shocks to the labor market and evaluate who wins 
and who loses in practice. I draw on novel data to identify 
natural experiments that generated as-good-as-random 
changes in labor demand conditions across both firms and 
regional labor markets. In each setting, I study who bears the 
benefit and burden of a different shock to the labor market, 
and, using economic theory as a guide, I highlight the princi-
ples that determine when demand-side policies successfully 
benefit the workforce. 
In the first essay (joint with Filipe Silverio), I study how 
firms mediate the benefits of labor-demand expansions 
that come from product-market-side incentives. When an 
employer experiences an increase in product demand or 
a subsidy to produce more—which in turn increases its 
demand for labor—does it raise wages for current employ-
ees? Or, are wages pinned down by competition from other 
employers in that labor market? To answer this question, we 
study unique data on Portuguese exporters and their employ-
ees, in which we can identify cases where individual firms 
did comparatively better or worse than their similar compet-
itors, based on where their customers were during the global 
Great Recession in 2008 and 2009. 
In the second and third essays I study the effects of 
two significant public infrastructure investment efforts on 
regional labor markets in the United States, shedding light 
on when such policies can bolster wages and job creation in 
target regions. One essay studies the short-run effectiveness 
of stimulus-funded highway construction projects as a means 
of boosting local employment—construction-sector employ-
ment in particular—in stagnating regions during the Great 
Recession. The other takes a long-run view and examines 
how the rapid construction of war plants during World War 
II in unusual locations (which were later reconverted for 
private civilian product and operated for decades afterwards) 
impacted regional manufacturing development, and, in turn, 
the availability of high-paying manufacturing jobs during the 
postwar era. In each of these studies, I collect new, geograph-
ically detailed, investment-level data sets that were crucial to 
conduct causal evaluations of each intervention. 
Chapter 1 
Do Wage Increases Reflect Firm-Level Labor 
Demand or Market Competition? Evidence 
from Idiosyncratic Export Demand Shocks 
(with Filipe Silverio)
What induces employers to raise their employees’ wages: 
their internal need for labor or competition from other 
employers in the labor market? In the canonical competitive 
labor market model, wages are determined by competition 
among employees and employers in labor markets, and firms 
always pay the same amount to identical workers. However, 
in real-world labor markets, where replacing employees and 
finding new jobs can be costly, workers at firms facing expan-
sionary demand on the product market side may be able to 
negotiate higher wages, regardless of the state of the outside 
labor market. Understanding how and why employers behave 
in practice is important for assessing the impact of labor mar-
ket interventions that target specific employers in large, global 
labor markets. Moreover, if wages are determined noncom-
petitively within firms in separate “internal labor markets” 
(Doeringer and Piore 1971), this might also in turn account 
for the well-documented role of firms in pay inequality found 
around the globe (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999; Barth 
et al. 2016; Card et al. 2016; Song et al. 2015). 
In this paper, we study how employers respond to changes 
in product market conditions that incentivize them to pro-
duce. Our goal is to test how much and under what circum-
stances firms raise wages to match heightened production 
goals—even when wage competition from rival employers 
remains unchanged. Such a test is difficult to implement 
in practice, as one needs to isolate a source of variation in 
demand conditions that affects output, employment, and 
wages but that is also, first, uncorrelated with any changes in 
the skills and effort employees bring to the table, and second, 
not associated with a general change in demand among rival 
employers. Several studies to date examine how changes in 
wage correlate with changes in output or productivity (Alva-
rez et al. 2018; Card, Devicienti, and Maida 2013; Guiso, 
Pistaferri, and Schivardi  2005); however, the conclusions 
that can be drawn from such studies are limited by the 
possibility that changes in output are driven either by labor 
supply (rather than labor demand) or by changes in labor 
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demand that are common to entire markets. This paper 
attempts to fill that gap. 
To assess the extent to which wages respond to firms’ 
internal labor demand rather than labor market competition, 
this paper studies a novel natural experiment that idiosyn-
cratically changed the individual firms’ product demand—
without affecting conditions at their closest labor-market 
competitors. We study how much Portuguese exporters’ abil-
ity to sell during the global Great Recession was impacted 
by where—but not what—they had been selling before 2008. 
As different countries’ import demands for any given product 
were jolted in unpredictable ways during this turbulent 
period, otherwise similar exporters experienced unexpectedly 
differential changes in product demand based solely on who 
their customers were—even those selling the same product. 
We follow a budding strain in the literature on interna-
tional trade (Berman, Berthou, and Hericourt  2015; Hum-
mels et al. 2014;  Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano 2016) and 
use very detailed data on how much of each detailed product 
variety each firm exported to each overseas destination to 
create measures of exposure to each foreign market. We then 
combine these exposure measures with observed changes 
in importing at each of those destinations during the Great 
Recession to create a measure of how much each firm’s 
export demand changed based on overseas conditions. 
Importantly, we implement a novel decomposition of the 
export demand change into two components: one reflecting 
global changes in product demand that might have affected 
many firms in a product market, and another that measures 
how much purchases of that product in the specific destina-
tion changed compared to other countries. 
We show that while both components have meaningful 
impacts on firms’ product and labor demand conditions, 
as evidenced by sales and payrolls, the former “common” 
component also affects the sales and payrolls of other close 
competitors. However, the second “idiosyncratic” component 
of an exporter’s demand shock impacts that specific firm, 
but it otherwise has no effect on close competitors. This 
offers precisely the sort of quasi-experimental differences 
in demand across firms necessary to test how much internal 
demand incentivizes firms to adjust wages. 
We find that, even in the absence of a marketwide demand 
shift, the wages of prerecession employees adjust signifi-
cantly in response to firm-level demand changes. A demand 
shift resulting in 10 percent more output results in a 1.5 per-
cent larger rise in hourly wages for those incumbent workers. 
These effects arise primarily within continuous employment 
spells at the initial employer, suggesting that these wage 
changes reflect bargaining power within the firm—and not an 
increase in general human capital. 
In our Portuguese setting, this bargaining power may arise 
in part from institutional restrictions on firing. Consistent 
with high firing costs, we find that employers also respond to 
production demand shocks by hiring more or fewer work-
ers—but not by firing existing employees. In addition, we 
find that in sectors where wage effects exist, they are widely 
shared across workers of different pay level, skill levels, 
genders, and occupations. 
However, wages do not respond in the same manner in all 
settings. Consistent with theories of firm-specific human cap-
ital (Becker 1962; Lazear 2009), costly searches for workers 
with unique skills (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994), and 
institutional firing costs (Lazear 1990), we find that wages 
only respond to firm-level demand in sectors with higher bar-
riers to employee turnover, which we infer based on low quit 
rates and longer tenures. In sectors with high barriers to turn-
over we find that the wage incidence of firm demand shocks 
is quite high: A shock that changes output by 10 percent 
leads to a 3 percent wage increase. By contrast, in sectors 
with low turnover costs, wages are mostly pinned down by 
labor market competition, and we find no evidence that firms 
adjust wages based on their own demand conditions. These 
findings suggest that turnover costs play an important role in 
wage determination—the easier it is to replace workers, the 
less wages reflect internal labor demand within the firm as 
opposed to labor market competition. 
These findings suggest that wages among otherwise 
identical workers can vary substantially due to circumstances 
at their firms that are beyond their control. Moreover, our 
estimates can reconcile a puzzle in the earlier literature of 
pay difference across firms: Card et al. (2016) find that while 
firms with 10 percent higher labor productivity levels have 
1.5 percent higher pay premiums in cross-sectional compari-
sons, nonexperimental studies that correlated changes in pay 
with changes in firm output rarely find wage increases large 
enough to rationalize the general productivity-pay relation-
ship. By contrast, in our experimental study, we find a causal 
relationship between firms’ output growth and wages that is 
much larger than implied by correlation analyses (including 
our own), and that exactly matches the cross-sectional pro-
ductivity-pay relationship. When we use our causal estimates 
to predict the amount of wage variance that should arise from 
differences in firm performance, we account for roughly 
the same share of the total variance in wages explained by 
firm-level pay premiums in the common decomposition from 
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). Thus, our estimates 
imply that changes in pay policy in response to employer 
performance can plausibly generate large cross-firm wage 
differentials—as long as there are sufficiently large barriers 
to replacing workers. These findings highlight the value of 
analyzing natural-experimental evidence in understanding 
the factors that drive wage determination. 
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Chapter 2
Putting America to Work, Where? Evidence on 
the Effectiveness of Infrastructure Construction 
as a Locally Targeted Employment Policy
This paper studies spending on public infrastructure 
construction projects—in particular, “shovel-ready” projects 
that can commence immediately upon funding—a frequently 
proposed policy intended to boost local construction employ-
ment and overall economic health. Such projects can target 
particular geographies in a highly visible way, making them 
intuitively appealing as way to boost employment in dis-
tressed areas. These projects inherently create a demand for 
construction laborers to go to work in precise locations. As 
a result, one might expect that approving a project in a place 
will increase local employment in the construction sector, 
and perhaps increase employment more broadly in turn as 
construction workers spend their earnings locally. Despite 
the intuitive appeal of these arguments, however, it is import-
ant to evaluate whether the data support them. 
To test these hypotheses, I study the 2009 American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the Recovery Act), which 
authorized $27 billion for supplemental shovel-ready road 
construction projects that could commence promptly, with 
priority given to economically distressed areas. In contrast 
to standard federal road expenditures, the Recovery Act 
required detailed reporting about all stimulus road construc-
tion projects nationwide. This provides a unique opportu-
nity to study the local employment effects of infrastructure 
spending. 
Using the Recovery Act’s spatially detailed data on 
infrastructure spending, I test whether places that received 
relatively more funding experienced more favorable employ-
ment outcomes than those that received relatively less using 
a variable treatment intensity difference-in-differences 
design. To the extent that construction workers might have 
been engaged in other construction work in the absence of 
the stimulus measure, counting bodies at project sites is 
insufficient; one must determine causal effects of spending 
relative to the no-spending counterfactual. To this end, I use 
a rich local-level data set to consider the plausibility of a 
selection-on-observables methodology. Contrary to concerns 
that funds were systematically targeted to places with unob-
servable worse downturns, I find surprisingly little evidence 
of any targeting based on observable employment trends. 
One advantage of studying government highway spend-
ing is that there is a clear transmission mechanism by which 
expenditures should affect local employment. The first-order 
“direct effect” should be on employment of construction 
workers involved in the projects themselves, and there 
should be a “local multiplier effect” on nonconstruction 
employment in the same region only to the extent that those 
workers’ expenditures support additional jobs. For any local 
multiplier effect to be plausible, it is necessary to first estab-
lish a credible direct effect on the construction sector. 
I find that highway construction did have a direct effect on 
construction employment at the county level. In particular, 
$1.00 of additional Recovery Act spending on local construc-
tion increased local construction payrolls by $0.30 during the 
five years after the act’s passage, almost exactly labor’s share 
of construction revenues nationwide. These labor market 
effects were largest in 2010 and dissipated gradually over the 
following years. I find no evidence of differential preperiod 
trends across differently treated counties, supporting the 
identification assumption that all effects are causal results of 
additional stimulus spending. The finding that the magnitude 
of the direct effect is roughly what one would expect with 
zero crowd-out suggests that targeted Recovery Act spending 
during the Great Recession did not crowd out other local 
construction. However, I find that commuting matters in that 
local spending only impacts local employment in more iso-
lated locales with smaller populations and smaller fractions 
of residents who travel to outside counties for work. When I 
test for effects in nearby commuting origins or destinations, I 
find some evidence of commuting spillovers, but the esti-
mates are highly imprecise. 
When I test for general equilibrium effects on the total 
employment and payroll levels within locales, I find effects 
close to zero, with very wide confidence intervals across all 
specifications. I find evidence suggesting that places with 
less commuting penetration have larger total employment 
effects, but the results are too imprecise to conclude that 
there is a large local multiplier anywhere. In sum, although I 
do not find evidence of large local multipliers, I cannot rule 
them out. A local multiplier of zero could simply indicate 
that the multiplier effects of localized spending are highly 
spatially diffuse; yet, an imprecise zero estimate may also 
merely reflect a lack of statistical power. While the Recovery 
Act was a significant enough intervention to have a sizable 
effect on the construction sector in low-mobility counties, 
the local variation in highway spending may have been too 
small relative to baseline regional volatility to detect a local 
multiplier. 
Importantly, although the magnitude of the effects on the 
construction sector is what one might expect in the absence 
of crowd-out, the implied cost per job I estimate is high 
relative to other estimates in the literature. My estimate of 
five construction job-years per $1 million implies that one 
construction job-year requires $200,000 in highway spending 
to be sustained. While I find a larger impact on construction 
employment compared to the state-level findings than in 
Leduc and Wilson (2017), the cost per construction job-year 
is much more expensive than the roughly $30,000 cost per 
total job-year in Suarez Serrato and Wingender (2014) and 
Buchheim and Watzinger (2017). In order to reconcile the 
construction employment effects I find—which imply a cost 
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per construction job of $200,000—with a $30,000 cost per 
total job, a construction job would have to result in the cre-
ation of five additional nonconstruction jobs. While not ruled 
out by my estimated effects on total employment, this is not 
plausible based on prior studies of local employment multi-
pliers, which typically find that an exogenous one job-year 
increase in low-skill work supports only one additional job in 
the same metropolitan area (Moretti 2010; van Dijk 2016). 
Chapter 3
Public Investment and the Spread of “Good-
Paying” Manufacturing Jobs: Evidence from 
World War II’s Big Plants
In this paper, I study the long-run local labor market 
effects of the publicly financed construction of large man-
ufacturing facilities during World War II (WWII). Many 
have hypothesized that the postwar expansion of high-wage 
manufacturing employment and associated “Great Com-
pression” in the earnings distribution was a direct result 
of the industrial mobilization for the war (Goldin and 
Margo 1992; Piketty 2014). This paper provides a direct test 
of this conjecture. In doing so, it speaks directly to a core 
question for economic policymakers: Can a brief public 
intervention have beneficial impacts on labor markets that 
persist well beyond the period of government intervention? 
Understanding the answer is vital to understanding whether 
industrial policy is justified in developing regions, whether 
place-based labor policies can help the middle class, and 
the extent to which infrastructure shapes how urban clus-
ters form and persist. However, opportunities to study this 
question directly are extremely rare—big “pushes” are few 
and far between, and when they do occur in the form of plant 
openings or major infrastructure works, they are typically 
systematically targeted at places that are expected to grow or 
to stagnate. 
The industrial expansion for WWII provides a unique 
opportunity to study this question. Due to the short-run 
military emergency, political and military leaders demanded 
that the United States increase its domestic industrial output 
nearly threefold over the course of only three or four years. 
This increment to output primarily consisted of airplanes, 
ships, ordnance (guns and ammunition of all varieties), 
explosives, and the metals and chemicals used in the produc-
tion of those various types of matériel. Although the military 
attempted to incentivize firms to put their own capital on the 
line and build plants as necessary, for some particularly large 
plants in secure locations, these incentives were insuffi-
cient to attract any private investment, particularly when an 
expensive plant was built to churn out a product that was 
insufficiently similar to products more likely to be demanded 
during peacetime. In these cases, the plants were ordered and 
owned by the U.S. government. As the private sector was 
unwilling to finance plant construction at the sites selected 
by the U.S. government, it is unlikely that similar plants 
would have been sited in the same locations if not for the 
war. These large, durable, public plants are more plausibly 
located for quasi-random short-run reasons than any compa-
rable infrastructure investment in Western history. 
To estimate the effects of siting a large plant in a specific 
locale, I compare counties that received large and completely 
federally funded plants to counties that were observably 
similar at the dawn of the Great Depression. My conjecture 
is that in the absence of a war, neither the control nor the 
treatment counties would have had such an additional plant 
open; the only reason potential outcomes differ across treat-
ment and control counties were circumstances created by 
the war. I hone in on control groups using several methods, 
although the choice of method does not significantly impact 
the results. To estimate the effects of plant sitings I adopt a 
difference-in-differences approach: After verifying that labor 
market conditions in treatment and control locales evolved 
similarly prior to WWII, I study how much more employ-
ment and wages rose in the treated locales compared to the 
control locales. I find evidence that among similar counties, 
publicly financed plants were as good as randomly assigned. 
By contrast, plants that received substantial private funding 
seem to be systematically located in regions experiencing 
higher prewar industrial expansion. This supports my focus 
on government-financed plants. 
I find that the construction of a large industrial plant 
during WWII had a large and persistent effect on the local 
labor market, with particularly pronounced effects on the 
manufacturing wage. After the postwar reconversion, man-
ufacturing employment in counties grew by 30 percent and 
remained elevated until the 1980s. Moreover, the average 
wage of local production-line workers rose by 10 percent, 
and this resulting wage differential persisted beyond even 
the 1980s. I find that these manufacturing sector effects are 
associated with a general increase in median family incomes 
and, to a lesser extent, with higher wages in other sectors. 
These findings highlight the large role that government- 
supported manufacturing expansions played in the spread 
of “good-paying” midcentury manufacturing jobs. These 
long-lived effects were the result of the initial investments 
during the war, not continued government or military invest-
ment. In fact, the most persistent effects were because of the 
groups of plants most likely to be reconverted for civil pur-
poses—those making planes, tanks, and steel—rather than 
specialized ordnance plants that tended to cater to military 
production throughout the Cold War era. However, while 
government spending on investment in manufacturing capital 
complimentary to labor had large effects, I find that wartime 
government spending in general did not boost wages in a 
similar manner, consistent with earlier work by Fishback and 
Cullen (2013). The effects I identify are large in magnitude 
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relative to the costs: At a 10 percent local income tax rate, 
local governments would have recovered roughly half of 
the cost of the plant construction from the payroll increment 
alone. 
This work adds to a growing literature evaluating the 
regional effects of place-based policies and large manufac-
turing investments. A study of “million dollar plants” that 
opened in the 1980s and 1990s (Greenstone, Hornbeck, and 
Moretti 2010) finds that while new plant sitings increase 
regional productivity, there were limited effects on local 
earnings; however, little is known about whether plant sitings 
had similar effects when manufacturing plants offered better 
work opportunities midcentury. Research on the Tennessee 
Valley Authority by Moretti and Kline (2014) finds that a 
major regional development push in the 1930s had long-run 
impacts, but it is difficult to conclude which aspects of the 
policy drove the results. 
While the identification of persistent effects on average 
wages is of interest, the implications for policy depend on 
the reason for the wage increases. On one hand, the increase 
in local average wages may reflect an actual increase in 
earnings opportunities for certain individuals—those who 
would have resided near the plant in any circumstance and 
who might have gained access to better jobs and work expe-
rience with the plant siting. On the other hand, the rise in 
local wages might merely reflect an inflow of skilled workers 
drawn to the new plant that would have earned the same 
higher wage in any case, but perhaps in another location. In 
this latter scenario, the investment might only change where 
people work without affecting any single individual’s earning 
opportunities. I propose a method to distinguish between 
these two scenarios by studying the long-run effects of plant 
siting on the individuals residing in county before WWII, 
rather than annual county-level aggregates. I discuss plans to 
use longitudinally linked microdata to extend the study along 
these lines. 
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